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Abstract — Password-based authentication schemes 
are the most widely used techniques for remote user 
authentication. Many static ID-based remote user 
authentication schemes both with and without smart cards 
have been proposed. Most of the schemes do not allow the 
users to choose and change their passwords, and maintain a 
verifier table to verify the validity of the user login. In this 
paper we present a dynamic ID-based remote user 
authentication scheme using smart cards. Our scheme allows 
the users to choose and change their passwords freely, and do 
not maintain any verifier table. The scheme is secure against 
ID-theft, and can resist the reply attacks, forgery attacks, 
guessing attacks, insider attacks and stolen verifier attacks.
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Index Terms — authentication, smart card, ID-theft, hash 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Password-based authentication schemes are the most widely 
used methods for remote user authentication. The resources 
distributed among the hosts are shared across the network in 
the form of network services provided by the remote systems. 
Before providing such services, the remote system should have 
ability to authenticate the users. Otherwise, an adversary could 
impersonate a legal user login to get access of the system. 
Existing password-based authentication schemes [1], [4]-[8], 
[10], [11] can be categorized into two types - one uses weak-
password and the other uses strong-password. The weak-
password authentication scheme is based on public-key 
cryptographic techniques (e.g. ElGamal’s scheme [3]) and has 
the advantage that the remote system does not need to keep a 
verifier table to verify the validity of the user login. Though, 
weak-password is easy to memorize; however, weak-password 
authentication schemes lead heavy computational load to the 
whole application system because of using public-key 
cryptographic techniques. In contrast, the computational load 
of most strong-password authentication schemes is lighter 
because of using only simple operations, e.g., one-way hash 
function [9] and exclusive-OR operation. The strong-password 
authentication schemes have another advantage over weak-
password authentication schemes that their implementations 
are easier and with less cost. However, a strong-password is 
difficult to memorize. Additionally, the strong-password 
authentication schemes suffer from stolen verifier attacks and 
guessing attacks. Several schemes and improvements [1], [2], 
[4]-[8], [10], [11] have been proposed, but these schemes are 
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based on static login ID. There are numerous applications 
where static login ID leaks partial information about the user’s 
login message to the adversary. The adversary could intercept 
the login ID and later try to manipulate it with other 
intercepted parameters to forge the login ID. One of the 
applications is digital library, where the subscriber needs to 
read and/or download the articles. Therefore, employing a 
dynamic ID for each login can avoid the risk of ID-theft. In 
this paper, we propose a dynamic ID-based remote user 
authentication scheme using smart cards. The proposed 
scheme allows the users to choose and change their password 
freely. The scheme is protected from ID-theft and the security 
of the scheme is based on a one-way hash function [9]. 
Moreover, the scheme does not maintain any verifier table, 
which strengthens the scheme against stolen verifier attacks. 
We shall analyze the security of the scheme and show that the 
scheme can resist other attacks, namely, the replay attacks, 
forgery attacks, guessing attacks and insider attacks. 
II. THE PROPOSED SCHEME 
The scheme is composed of two parts, namely, the registration 
phase and the authentication phase. The registration phase is 
performed only once, and the authentication phase is executed 
every time the user logs into the system. The notations used 
throughout this paper are as follows: 
U      the user. 
PW     the password of U. 
S      the remote system. 
h(.)     a one-way hash function. 
     bitwise XOR operation. 
AB: M A sends M to B through a secure channel. 
A→B: M A sends M to B through a common channel. 
 
A. Registration Phase 
This phase is invoked whenever a user Ui registers to the 
remote system. The user chooses password iPW  and submits 
it to the remote system. Upon receiving the registration 
request, the remote system performs the following steps: 
1. Computes a nonce )()( xhPWhN ii  , where x is a 
secret key of the remote system. 
2. Personalizes the smart card with the parameters (.)h , 
iN and y ; where y is a remote system’s secret number 
stored in each registered user’s smart card. 
3. SUi: iPW  and smart card. 
 
B. Authentication Phase 
This phase is invoked whenever a user wants to login the 
remote system. The phase is further divided into two parts, 
namely, the login phase and the verification phase. In the login 
 phase, U will send a login message to S. The login message 
contains a dynamic ID, called CID , which is dependent on the 
user password and remote system’s secret parameters. After 
successful verification of the login message, the remote system 
allows the user to access the system. The login phase and the 
verification phase work as follows: 
Login Phase: The user iU  inserts his smart card to the card 
reader of a terminal, and keys his password iPW . Then, the 
smart card will perform the following operations: 
1. Computes )()( TyNhPWhCID iii  , where T  is 
the current date and time of iU ’s system. 
2. Computes ))(( iii PWhCIDhB  .  
3. Computes )( yBNThC iii  .  
4. UiS: TCNCID iii ,,, .  
 
Verification Phase: Upon receiving the login message 
( TCNCID iii ,,, ) at the time 
*T , the remote system 
authenticates the user iU with the following steps: 
1. Verify the validity of the time interval between T  and 
*T . If TTT  )( * , where T  denotes the expected 
valid time interval for transmission delay, then the remote 
system rejects the login request. 
2. Computes )()( TyNhCIDPWh iii  . 
3. Computes ))(( iii PWhCIDhB  . Thereafter, checks 
whether )( yBNThC iii  . If it holds, the remote 
system accepts the login request. Otherwise, rejects the 
login request and terminates the operation.  
 
C. Password Change Phase 
This phase is invoked whenever the user Ui wants to change 
his password. He can easily change his password without 
taking any assistance from the remote system. The phase 
works as follows:  
1. The user Ui inserts the smart card into the smart card 
reader of a terminal. He submits the password iPW  and 
requests to change the password.  
2. Then Ui chooses new password *iPW .  
3. The smart card computes 
)()( ** iiii PWhPWhNN  , which yields 
)()( * xhPWh i  . 
4. The nonce iN  will be replaced with *iN . The password 
has been changed with the new password *iPW  and 
terminates the operation. 
III. SECURITY ANALYSIS 
In the following, we analyze the security of our scheme: 
1. A replay attack (replaying the intercepted login message) 
cannot work because it will fail the Step 1 of verification phase 
for the time interval TTT  )( * .  
2. An adversary cannot impersonate a legal login even he 
intercepts iii CNCID ,,  and T. To forge a valid login, the 
adversary needs to know two secret parameters 
iB ( ))(( ii PWhCIDh   and y, because iC  is to be 
computed as )( yBNThC iii  . It is difficult to guess 
the user password and very difficult to get y from the user 
smart card. Thus, the adversary cannot forge a valid login. 
 
3. It is hard for any adversary to derive the user password or 
system secret key x from iN , because the one-way hash 
function is computationally infeasible to inverse [9]. The 
security of iC is also based on hash function. Moreover, an 
adversary cannot perform an off-line guessing attack of iC , 
because it is computed with two secret parameters iB  and y. 
 
4. In practice, it is likely that the user Ui uses the same 
password iPW  to access several servers for his convenience. 
If an insider of a remote system obtains iPW , he could 
impersonate Ui’s login to access other servers. In our scheme, 
the user Ui will not reveal iPW  to the remote system, instead, 
the verifier obtains )( iPWh  in the verification process. But, it 
is difficult to get iPW  from its hash value. Moreover, the 
remote system does not maintain any verifier table through 
which a dishonest party can steal the user password. Thus, the 
proposed scheme can resist the insider attack and stolen 
verifier attacks. 
 
5. If the adversary gets user password, he still cannot forge 
user login. To create a forged login, he also needs the secret 
number y stored in a user smart card, which is extremely 
difficult to get it. Additionally, once the user comes to know 
that his password is leaked, the user can easily invoke the 
password change protocol and changes his password without 
any assistance of the remote systems.  
 
Thus, the proposed scheme can resist the reply attacks, 
forgery attacks, guessing attacks, insider attacks and stolen 
verifier attacks.  
IV. CONCLUSION 
We have proposed a dynamic ID-based remote user 
authentication scheme, which allows the users to choose and 
change their passwords freely. By employing a dynamic ID, 
the scheme is protected from ID-theft. As the scheme does not 
maintain any verifier table to verify the validity of the user 
login, it eliminates the remote system’s overheads and 
strengthens the protocol against stolen verifier attacks. The 
security of the scheme is based on one-way hash function, 
which is infeasible to inverse.  We have shown that the scheme 
can resist the reply attacks, forgery attacks, guessing attacks 
and insider attacks.  
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